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Remittances and Development 
in South Asia
Dr Rashid Amjad
he outflow of migrant workers and the inflow of overseas 
remittances have had a profound impact on the economies of 
South Asia.  Clearly this impact varies depending upon the T
size of the migration outflow in relation to the total labour force and 
remittances as a percentage of gross export earnings or the domestic 
product in different countries.  
In Pakistan during the 1980s migration and remittance flows were 
perhaps the single most important factor in explaining the rapid 
decline in poverty during these years.  In Sri Lanka, where nearly half 
of out-migrants are women, migration and remittances have both 
affected the labour market and foreign exchange position of the 
country. In Bangladesh and India migration outflows have been 
significant but never so large to have a major impact on the labour 
market, although in India at the regional level e.g., Kerala and in 
certain districts of Bangladesh the impact may have been more 
important. In Bangladesh and India remittances are still significant 
as a proportion of the gross domestic product.
This paper reviews the trends in remittances post-September 11, 
2001 and analyses factors which may explain a significant increase in 
three of the four South Asian economies reviewed in the paper, 
namely, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka and the impact of 
this increase on economic developments in these countries.
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Remittances and Development
There is rich literature available on the impact of remittances on 
economic development as well as more specifically on the labour 
market and poverty in developing countries.  Of special interest is the 
recent study by Adams and Page (2003) of the World Bank which, 
based on a new data set of 74 low and middle-income developing 
countries, has concluded that, 'international migration - defined as 
the share of a country's population living abroad  has a strong 
statistical impact on reducing poverty.  On average, a 10 per cent 
increase in the share of international migrants in a country's 
population will lead to a 1.9 per cent decline in the share of people 
living in poverty (US$ 1.00/person/day).' As regards remittances, 
their key conclusion is that, 'international remittances defined as the 
share of remittances in a country GDP  has a strong, statistical 
impact on reducing poverty.  On average, a 10 per cent increase in 
the share of international remittances in a country's GDP will lead to 
a 1.6 per cent decline in the share of people living in poverty'.
The other major recent development has been the increased concern 
about the security implications of formal and informal (havala) 
remittance systems and their susceptibility to money laundering or 
terrorist financing.  At a recent International Conference on Migrant 
Remittances (London, 9-10 October 2003), organised jointly by the 
U.K.'s Department for International Development (DFID) and the 
World Bank in collaboration with the International Migration Policy 
Programme (IMP), this issue of increasing transparency and 
accountability in remittance flows was discussed with a view to 
determine the optimal legal and regulatory framework for 
remittances.  The meeting especially addressed the concern that  
tighter controls in the form of greater regulatory supervision on 
remittances  may reduce availability and drive up costs of services for 
the migrants.
The paper does not rigorously pursue the conclusions of the Adams 
and Page  study or the issue of building up an optimal regulatory 
framework for remittances but does explore both issues in the 
context of changing levels of remittances to the four South Asian 
economies in recent years.
Officially recorded remittance flows, based on data from their 
respective central banks, to the four South Asian countries are shown 
1in Table 1 .  In Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, they show a 
significant increase as compared to the 2000-01 inflows.  The most 
dramatic increase is in Pakistan where remittances increased four-
fold from just over US$1 billion in 2000-01 to over US$4 billion in 
2002-03.  In Bangladesh, they increased by over 70 per cent from 
around US$1.9 billion to over US$ 3.3 billion.  For India the increase 
was around 25 per cent from around US$12 billion to slightly over 
US$ 15 billion. The impact of remittances on the national economy 
can be gauged by seeing it as a percentage of gross domestic or 
national product.
In Table 2, besides reporting the Adams and Page estimates for the 
late 1990s, we have recalculated remittances as a percentage of gross 
national product (GNP) for 2002-03 (2001-2002 for Sri Lanka).  
Though the data are not strictly comparable, as for 2003-02 we have 
used the GNP estimate which means that as a percentage of GDP the 
ratio of remittances would be slightly higher, the figures are still very 
revealing.  They show an almost doubling of percentage for 
Bangladesh from around 3-6 per cent, about a 15 per cent increase 
for India and a more than three-fold increase for Pakistan to around 
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7 per cent of GNP.  In Sri Lanka there is only a marginal increase in 
part because most remittances were sent through official channels.
Based on the results of the Adams and Page study we should see a 
significant fall in poverty in South Asia, especially in the case of 
Pakistan and Bangladesh. Outflows of migrant workers and inflows 
of remittances to Pakistan in the 1980s had been perhaps the single 
most important factor explaining a rapid decline in poverty during 
2this period . 
In analysing this impact especially on poverty a number of caveats 
need to be kept in mind.  The most important of these is that the 
sudden jump  in remittances to these countries does not appear to 
have been the result of any significant increase in the outflows of 
migrants from them.  What appears most likely to have happened 
and what national official sources attribute this increase to is that in 
the post 9/11 period the inflows of remittances began to come much 
more through official rather than the previous unofficial (havala) 
channels as financial controls and scrutiny were tightened on such 
transfers, especially in the United States.
This is perhaps best illustrated by looking at the main sources of 
increase in remittances to Pakistan (Table 3).   Between 2000-01 and 
2002-03 while there is a general increase for all countries, the really 
big jump is from the United States where remittances increased from 
around US$ 135 million to US$ 1238 million.  In the case of the UAE 
Recent Trends in Remittances 
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Table 1:  Remittance Inflows : Annual 
Source:  Data from website of Bangladesh Bank;  Reserve Bank of India; State Bank of 
Pakistan and  Central Bank of Sri Lanka.  For India for 2003-04 from 
Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey, 2003-04.    
Table 2: Remittances as % of GDP /GNP
1995, 1996 or 1997 as % of 
GDP 
2002 -03 as % of GNP
Bangladesh  3.16  (1996)  6.0  
India  2.7 (1997) 3.07  
Pakistan  2.19 (1997)  7.0  
Sri Lanka 6.06  (1995)  6.46 (2001 -02)  
Source: For 1995, 1996  or 1997, Adams and Page (2003); For 2002 -03 data on remittances 
from Table 1 an d GNP from World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2004.  
 Table 3:  Pakistan: Inflow of remittances by country of origin Million US $  Country
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88.40
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567.93
Encashment/  
profit  FEBCs
64.98 48.26 46.12 45.42
Total 1086.57 2389.05 4236.85 3871.58
Source: State Bank of Pakistan (Website).
 
also there is an increase from US$ 190 to US$ 838 million.  It is also 
important to note that in fact total inflow of remittances actually fell 
between 2002-03 and 2003-04 for Pakistan from around US$ 4.1 
billion to US$ 3.9 billion with inflows from the United States 
remaining at the same level but falling sharply in the case of UAE 
from US$ 837 to US$ 597 million.
While we have not been able to examine the sources of increase for 
Bangladesh and India, in all probability the same has happened in 
these countries.  Therefore, the increase signals a much greater flow 
of remittances from official channels of either incomes earned or 
past savings of migrants in the host countries.  It is also probable 
that some of this increase is also money transferred in the face of 
greater scrutiny of bank accounts in these countries. The first 
question that we explore is the economic impact on the receiving 
countries as a result of this increase in remittances through official 
channels. 
One unambiguous advantage that accrued as a result of the increase 
in official remittance flows  was that it improved, and in the case of 
Pakistan dramatically, the balance of payments situation.   This 
increase in remittances, if substantial, can contribute significantly 
towards stabilizing the exchange rate, increasing availability of 
foreign exchange  for imports, lessen dependence on foreign 
borrowing and in some cases relieve the pressures to accept the 
harsh  conditionalities imposed on such borrowing especially by the 
IMF and the World Bank.
For Pakistan's economy, which had been in a deep recession for 
many years, this increase in inflows was 'manna from heaven'.  The 
rupee exchange rate against the US dollar was depreciating in the 
late 1990s due to an unfavourable balance of payments situation and 
a decline in aid inflows following the 1998 nuclear explosion.   To 
prevent rupee resources from flowing into dollars during this period, 
which was possible as controls on nationals keeping foreign exchange 
accounts were considerably relaxed, thus leading to a further 
depreciation of the rupee the rate of interest on domestic savings was 
kept very high.  This had a dampening affect on investment.   
Interestingly, after the large increase in remittances post- September 
2001, the dilemma was reversed as the government now 
endeavoured to prevent the rupee from appreciating sharply against 
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the dollar which would reduce competitiveness of the country's 
major exports.  Once the exchange rate was stabilized the State Bank 
was able to reduce drastically the rate of interest which was an 
important factor in both increasing consumer borrowing and new 
investment which helped turn around the economy.  Also the 
resurgence of the national economy and improved macroeconomic 
indicators and balance of payments position led to not renewing the 
IMF's PRGF programme, with its harsh conditionalities, from the 
end of 2004 which it had entered into to help stabilize the economy 
3in 2000 .
 
In Bangladesh the increase in remittances from US$ 1.5 billion in 
1997-98 to US$3.3 billion in 2003-04 was an important factor in 
putting into effect currency reforms including the free floatation of 
the currency from May 31st, 2003.  Bangladesh had been under 
pressure from the World Bank and the IMF for a few years to float 
the currency but had earlier hesitated to do so until it felt that it had 
adequate foreign reserves.  The strong inflow of remittances allowed 
foreign reserves to increase and provided the confidence to float the 
4currency .    
For India the balance of payments situation was already very healthy 
with large reserves building up as a result of very high foreign direct 
and portfolio investment and therefore the increase in remittances 
by themselves did not have a significant impact on the exchange rate 
or overall monetary policy. India's foreign exchange reserves 
(including gold and special drawing rights) had reached US$ 118.6 
billion on May 7th, 2004  an unprecedented increase of US$ 42.5 
5  billion since the end of March 2002 . However, the increase in 
remittances did contribute to the current account moving into 
surplus in 2001-02 for the first time in 24 years in spite of a sizeable 
trade deficit.  Remittances over US$ 15 billion in 2002-03 more than 
offset the US$ 12.9 billion trade deficit that year and almost fully 
financed it during April-December 2003.
For India, a factor that may have contributed to the increase in 
remittances, besides pressures to send them through official 
channels was the relatively more attractive rate of interest being 
offered by the Reserve Bank of India as compared to the historical all 
time low interest rates in the United States and most developed 
economies.  One result of the increase in foreign reserves, to which 
remittances contributed marginally, has been the pressure on the 
exchange rate to appreciate.  In March-April 2004 as foreign 
exchange inflows accelerated the rupee rose in value by 2 per cent 
against the US dollar despite the intervention by the Reserve Bank of 
India to buy US dollars.  It would appear that the overall policy being 
currently followed by the Reserve Bank is to allow the rupee to 
appreciate if inflows of 'hot money', encouraged by the rising US-
6dollar returns, continue to accelerate .  These movements also shows 
that exchange rate in India is now increasingly determined by capital 
7flows and not by trade flows as conventional theory would predict . 
In Sri Lanka remittances primarily from housemaids working in the 
Middle-East are the second leading net foreign-exchange earner after 
garments and are an important balancing element in the current 
account, usually offsetting around 60 per cent of the trade deficit. In 
2002, private transfers, primarily transfers from housemaids in the 
Middle-East, were sufficient to finance 90 per cent of the combined 
8deficit on the trade, services and income accounts .  There was no 
significant increase in these remittances most probably as they were 
being sent through official channels although we do not have the 
most recent data.
The next important question we need to explore is the extent to 
which the increase in remittances injects increased demand or 
purchasing power into the economy, thereby stimulating growth in 
the respective economies.  This would depend critically upon how 
much of this increase in remittances simply represents migrants 
switching from sending funds through formal rather than non-
formal channels.  And, if there was an increase in total remittances 
being sent back, that is through both official and non-official sources, 
the magnitude of this increase and its causes need to be explored.
Again evidence on both counts is very sparse. A study carried out by 
the ILO in the late 1980s estimated that of total remittances flowing 
9into Pakistan around 57 per cent was through official channels .  If 
one was to use the same benchmark, the total flow of remittances in 
2000-01 would have been double at nearly US$ 2 billion as 
compared to the official inflow of US$ 1 billion.  Continuing on the 
same assumption one could argue that of the US$ 4 billion that came 
as remittances in 2002-03 the net increased inflow into the economy 
was around US$ 2 billion. This represents a major injection into the 
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domestic economy of Pakistan at around 5 per cent of GDP.  It is also 
of the same magnitude as the country's total Public Sector 
Development Plan (PSDP) in that year.  
We do not have any surveys available to estimate the break-up of 
total remittances into official and unofficial inflows for the other 
countries and even the estimate for Pakistan is dated to a time when 
the rupee was still overvalued and there were much stricter 
restrictions on foreign exchange holdings and transfers by  Pakistani 
residents and non-residents.  While therefore being extremely 
cautious in drawing conclusions one could say that depending on a 
host of factors, and using the previous Pakistan study as some kind 
of a benchmark, anywhere up to 50 per cent of the increase in 
remittance through official channels in recent years could have been 
net additions to the remittances flowing into the country.
If indeed there was an increase in the remittances being sent through 
both formal and informal channels post-9/11, what could have been 
the reasons for it to happen?   One factor which could have 
influenced this decision was the uncertainty and insecurity felt by the 
migrants in the post-9/11 atmosphere which made them, especially 
those living in the United States, to transfer a greater amount of their 
current earnings and possibly even more importantly transfer part of 
their accumulated savings to their home countries.  The ILO/ARTEP 
(1987) survey of return migrants in Pakistan had shown that 
migrants keep part of their incomes as savings in the host country 
which they bring along with them on their final return.  Also part of 
the increased remittances could have been transfer of deposits in 
banks which their owners felt may be subject to greater scrutiny.  If 
these were indeed significant factors responsible for a possible 
increase in the overall remittances post-9/11 through official and 
unofficial channels, the flows could become more volatile in the 
foreseeable future depending very much on general conditions 
prevailing in the migrant's country of residence.
We now examine whether this increase in remittances, through both 
official and non-official channels, would have a positive impact on 
poverty as argued by Adams and Page.  To the extent that these 
inflows increased domestic demand, stimulated new investment and 
spurred economic growth clearly the impact in the medium and long 
term on poverty should be positive.
However, we cannot say whether they would have a direct and more 
immediate impact on poverty levels.  The best outcomes, in terms of 
poverty impact, is if the increase in remittances, is the result of an 
increase in the outflow of migrant workers from the county.  And to 
the extent that these workers are mainly semi-skilled or unskilled 
and come from poor households, the money they send back has an 
immediate impact on the living standards of the families left behind.  
This is clearly what happened in Pakistan during the 1980s when the 
major migration took place to the Middle-East, mainly of skilled, 
semi-skilled and unskilled workers.
In the given circumstances this increase would have a far less 
immediate  favourable impact on poverty and certainly not of the 
magnitude that Adams and Page stipulate.  Indeed the results of 
recent survey in Pakistan on poverty shows some marginal decline in 
2003-04 after increasing in the past decade but the immediate 
impact is clearly far less than one would have expected from the 
10magnitude of the increase in remittances .
Some evidence on this can be gauged from the areas in which 
remittances have been flowing in Pakistan after the recent upsurge.  
The present boom in real estate prices and the stock market has been 
credited to a large extent to remittances from abroad.  Also the 
increase in sales of consumer durables, mainly cars,  facilitated by 
favourable lending arrangements, all seem to suggest that these 
remittances are coming from more well-to-do migrants  rather than 
from the average skilled and unskilled workers in the Gulf. Also these 
inflows are going into bank deposits rather than National Savings 
11Schemes which were mainly favoured earlier .  
Finally, on the issue of havala  and other informal funds transfer 
system, where cash is accepted at one location and a corresponding 
cash sum to a beneficiary paid at another location by a message or 
phone call, a number of steps have been initiated,  including by the 
IMF and national banking authorities  to ensure that consistent anti-
money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures are 
imposed on all forms of money or value transfer systems -- informal 
as well as formal.  
However, the success of any such measures needs to consider the 
factors which have encouraged migrants to send remittances through 
213212
unofficial channels, the most important of which is the low cost and 
timely delivery of funds as compared to the formal banking system.  
Before enacting legislation or other measures, policy makers and 
central bankers need to analyse the role of havala and other informal 
transfer services, on how they can be better regulated and the formal 
banking system made more efficient in transferring funds; otherwise 
any new legislation or regulation could only drive these operations 
12further underground . 
Conclusion
The large increases in remittances post-9/11 in at least three of the 
four South Asian economies -- Bangladesh, India and Pakistan -- 
have had a significant impact on economic development. Based on 
our preliminary analysis of the causes and nature of this increase its 
immediate impact on poverty alleviation may be far less as compared 
to earlier inflows. In the medium and long term it could still have a 
positive impact on poverty as Adams and Page stipulate.  There is a 
need for carrying out more analysis including primary data collection 
in both countries of residence and origin of the migrants to better 
gauge the economic and development impact of these flows including 
on reducing poverty.
Dr Rashid Amjad is Director, Policy Planning, Employment Sector 
at the International Labour Organization, ILO, in Geneva.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not 
necessarily reflect those of the ILO. The author would like to thank 
Asif Ismail for his helpful comments on the paper.
 
Endnotes  
1 A comparison of these figures with those from the IMF on workers 
remittances used by other studies including Adams and Page show 
broadly the same magnitudes except in the case of India where the IMF 
figures for 2000, 2001 and 2002 are given as slightly over US $ 8 billion.  
While estimates in Table 1 for India and Sri Lanka represent private 
transfers on the balance of payments account these comprise 
predominantly of inflows of remittances from Sri Lankans and Indians 
working abroad as cited in official publications of both countries. ( For 
IMF data see International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments 
Statistics Yearbook 2003, Table B-19 Workers' Remittances.).     
2 See Amjad and Kemal (1997)
3 See Ishrat Hussain, Governor, State Bank of Pakistan, 'Why Pakistan 
should Exit the IMF Programme', Daily Dawn, February 29 and March 1, 
2004. 
4 See Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2003 Bangladesh. 
London.
5 See Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2004 India. London
6 See Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report India, 01 June 2004. 
London 
7 'In more recent times, with the tail of mobile capital accounts wagging 
the dog of the balance of payments , the importance of capital flows 
determining the exchange rate has increased considerably, rendering 
some of the earlier guideposts of monetary policy formulation 
anachronistic. … On a day to day basis it is capital flows which influence 
the exchange rate and interest rate arithmetic', Rakesh Mohan, Deputy 
Governor, Reserve Bank of India, speech at the 22nd Anniversary 
Lecture of the Central Banking Studies at the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 
Colombo, 21 November, 2003.
8 See Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2004, Sri Lanka, 
London.
9 ILO/ARTEP, Impact of out and return migration on domestic 
employment and labour market situation in Pakistan, 1987. Report 
submitted to the Pakistan Planning Commission.
10 See Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Economic Survey 2003-04, 
Islamabad.
11 I am grateful to Sakib Sherani for pointing this out.
12 See remarks by Agustin Carstens, Deputy Managing Director, 
International Monetary Fund at the IMF Seminar on Current 
Developments in Monetary and Financial Law, Washington D.C., May 
24-June 4, 2004 (IMF Website).
References
lRichard H. Jr. Adams and John Page, 'International Migration, 
Remittances and Poverty in Developing Countries,' World Bank 
Research Working Paper 3179, December 2003.
lRashid Amjad (ed.), To the Gulf and Back: Studies on the Economic 
Impact of Asian Labour Migration, (ILO/ARTEP, 1989). 
lRashid Amjad and A.R.Kemal, 'Macroeconomic Policies and their impact 
on Poverty Alleviation in Pakistan', The Pakistan Development Review, 
Winter 1997, Islamabad.
lILO/ARTEP, Impact of Out and Return Migration on Domestic 
Employment and Labour Market in Pakistan, vol. I to VII, Asian 
Employment Programme, 1989.
215214
A Currency Union for South Asia
J Ravikumar Stephen
urope had to face two great wars to go through the new 
renaissance, which made the European nations bury their 
hatchet for a political and economic cooperation within E
Europe. The recent result of the referendum in France was just a 
break speed on the slippery route to an economic/political 
integration of Europe. Integration of Europe is a mere survival need; 
hence, sooner or later this  is going to be a reality. No way, the need 
of South Asia is dissimilar to that of Europe, East Asia, Africa and the 
Pax-Americana. Before doing the SWOT analysis for South Asia, let 
us try to re-learn what is money and its significance in terms of 
international trade.
Currency and Exchange Rates
Money can be described as a unit of account in which debts and 
prices are expressed.  In a hypothetical world in which the number of 
currencies equaled the number of commodities, the usefulness of 
money in its roles of unit of account and medium of exchange would 
disappear, and trade might just as well be conducted in terms of pure 
barter.
Money is a convenience and this restricts the optimum number of 
currencies and most of the nations consider that a national currency 
is a means to achieve identity among other nations.  Till the late 19th 
century, people used to fix currencies to gold.  In international 
trading if the prices of foreign goods are expressed in terms of 
foreign currency, then it must be translated into domestic currency 
prices as well.  In practice, it is realized that more the number of 
